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(Prior to the following discussion, several videos were played
for the audience, including the video interview between Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Professor Gormley).
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: One of the unique things about
this program is that it really is designed to preserve a vital piece
of American history before it vanishes.
A film of the whole event will be donated to the Truman Library
for its archives, as well as, a special issue of Duquesne Law Re-
view devoted to the proceedings, along with articles and contribu-
tions from our esteemed panelists.
Much of the impetus for this program really came from the Du-
quesne Law Review. The editors were thrilled from the start
when Professor Nick Fisfis and I suggested the idea of building a
program around the 50th anniversary, the Golden Anniversary of
the Steel Seizure Case.
The Law Review editors, I have to tell you, have worked dili-
gently to prepare us with background material and to otherwise
help as co-planners, and so therefore, I would like to call upon the
editor-in-chief of the Law Review, Robert "Rocky" Kravetz, and
ask him to introduce today's panelists.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Thank you, Professor Gormley.
No individual fascinates the American public more than the
president. For over two centuries, presidents have remained a
focal point of our system of government.
From George Washington to George W. Bush, the individuals
who have occupied the office have been judged according to the
decisions they have made at the times in which they have made
them.
Today, we examine one such decision by President Harry S.
Truman. His seizure of the steel mills in 1952 has remained at
the center of a constitutional debate over the extent of presidential
powers.
It is a debate that struggles to define the proper scope of our
system of government as between the three branches and among
the people.
It is also a debate, as you will see this afternoon, that turns as
much on the context of times and public opinion as it does on the
substance of presidential action, and it is a debate that today,
more than ever, is worthy of discussion. So without further delay,
it is my honor, on behalf of the Duquesne Law Review, as well as
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the entire student body of Duquesne University, to introduce our
distinguished panel, and I would ask each panelist to join me on
stage as I call your name.
All of you in the audience may want to pay special attention to
the photos on the screens behind me that will be put up. Some of
our panelists may look a little bit different than they do today.
Our first panelist is Milton Kayle, who served as special assis-
tant to President Truman in the White House.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Second, Ken Hechler, this year's recipient of
the Harry S. Truman Public Service Award, who was also a spe-
cial assistant on President Truman's White House staff.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Third, David Feller, Assistant General Coun-
sel to the United Steelworkers of American at the time of the steel
seizure controversy, who worked closely with Arthur Goldberg on
every aspect of the case.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Fourth, Stanley Temko, who filed a certiorari
petition in the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States Steel
Corporation.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Fifth, John Barrett, who is completing his bi-
ography of Justice Robert Jackson.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Sixth, Dr. Maeva Marcus, Supreme Court his-
torian, who is author of the definitive account of the Steel Seizure
Case.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Seventh, Judge Abner Mikva, who unfortu-
nately could not be here today because he is chairing unexpected
ABA hearings in Dallas, but we will hear from him in writing
during the panel discussion, and he has agreed to contribute a
piece to the Law Review.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Finally, our moderator for today's program,
Professor Ken Gormley.
(Applause.)
MR. KRAVETZ: Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in wel-




PROFESSOR GORMLEY: All right. My first question is for
Mr. Kayle. You were a special assistant in the White House under
President Truman at the time of these events.
What was the White House being told by the Department of
Justice and the president's military advisors about the need for
presidential action to deal with the steel crisis?
MR. KAYLE: Well, there was no question, as far as the Justice
Department and the Defense Department were concerned, that it
was essential to keep the production of steel going.
The problem was the statutory provisions that could be looked
at at that particular time, and my assignment was to meet with
the officials from both departments and to come up with what
seemed to be the most appropriate action.
The key thing to remember, keep in mind, is that production of
steel is one thing, but it is the end product that's involved.
The military doesn't buy steel per se. It buys end products, so
the problem always was to trace back what particular mills were
producing the steel products in question, and when you looked at
the basic statutory provisions, first of all, there was the Defense
Production at Title II, which provided for the requisition of prop-
erty.
It was certainly inappropriate in terms of our particular situa-
tion.
Then we had Section 18 of the Selective Service Act. This did
have seizure procedures, but again, a very difficult question in
terms of kind.
The President had to issue an executive order to the National
Security Resources Board. It had to identify the particular mills
that were producing the end product in question. There was also
the possibility that there had to be an actual cessation of work by
the workers before you could invoke that particular statute, so all
things being equal, of course the alternative was the Taft-Hartley
Act.
The point to keep in mind was at that stage of the game, the un-
ion had stated that not only had they accepted the recommenda-
tions of the Wage Stabilization Board, but they had stayed on the
job longer than 80 days, so that invoking the emergency provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act was both unfair, as far as the administra-
tion was concerned, and impractical, in the sense that you would
just postpone for 80 days a decision which eventually had to be
made that was not going to answer our particular urgency.
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Also, it was felt that by resorting to the inherent powers of the
President, seizure under Article II, the message would be given to
the industry that there was no intention on the part of the Presi-
dent to invoke Taft-Hartley, and it was our hope that based on
normal judicial procedures, once that message was delivered,
there would never be any constitutional law crisis.
Of course Justice Frank's decision changed the whole picture,
but when we decided do recommend the seizure, there was a tre-
mendous public relations uproar against what the President had
in mind.
David Lawrence, in particular, claimed that the President had
made a separate deal with the union, and he harangued in the
press against what the President had in mind, and that was a
small part of what was going on in terms of a very well organized
campaign by the industry to put the President in the most unde-
sirable light, so we thought that by recommending the -- the sei-
zure per se, that in due course, having given the message to the
industry by way of the District Court activity, we would get a solu-
tion.
Of course Justice Pike ignored a traditional principle in terms of
litigation, where wherever possible, you avoid the constitutional
law issue.
We had no idea that he was going to decide the case on the mer-
its, rather than the usual equitable proceedings, where you meas-
ure the harm to each party and decide accordingly. There were
more than enough remedies in terms of making whole the indus-
try if we were to follow that procedure and --
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Mr. Kayle, let me just cut in for a
second and ask you what historians like to say, that President
Truman got bad advice from his advisors.
Would you say that's true? You were one of them.
(Laughter.)
MR. KAYLE: You know, I -- the biographers, all of the biogra-
phers of the president have indicated, either they implied bad le-
gal advice, or they implied impetuous reckless action by the Presi-
dent, but I would like to read something which I wrote in a memo-
randum after meeting with the Justice Department officials, and I
sent this to the White House staff.
As an alternative to invoking Section 18, authority for seizure
under the Selective Service Act, the President could seize the steel
industry, relying upon the inherent powers of the executive.
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However, the major difficulty here is the questionable legal ba-
sis, because there were three seizures and labor disputes prior to
World War II on the basis of the inherent powers of the President.
These cases were never litigated in the courts.
Since that time, however, the national emergency provisions,
emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and Section 18 of the
Selective Service Act have been enacted.
It could be argued, therefore, that the President -- that Con-
gress's actions in passing legislation in these specific areas have
limited the discretionary power of the President as the chief ex-
ecutive.
My point is, the legal advice was given to the President.
He was the one to have to make the decision, and it was -- it
was beyond our -- our thoughts that we would end up in a consti-
tutional crisis based on our hope that the District Court would act
accordingly.
If Pine had not reached the decision that he did the way that he
reached it, I am not sure all of us would be here today.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Well, let me ask you, putting
Judge Pine aside, though, the public reaction and the commentary
was clearly negative.
If you look at some of these press clippings that the Law Review
got for us, they don't mince any words in criticizing President
Truman.
The Chicago Daily News called it leaping socialism.
The New York Daily News said, "Hitler and Mussolini would
have loved this."
The Washington Post wrote, "President Truman's seizure of the
steel industry will probably go down in history as one of the most
high-handed acts committed by an American President."
What spurred that intense negative reaction?
MR. KAYLE: Well, first of all, I think there was a well-
organized public relations campaign, which Clarence Randall
talked about later in the tape.
There were all kinds of funds for this particular engine; no ques-
tion about it.
It is -- it is ridiculous to think Harry Truman, the man from
Missouri, was entitled to -- was out to grab all kinds of power and
to make this a socialist country. It made no sense at all.
He was the President. He saw he had an obligation, as Com-
mander in Chief, as well to see to it that production continued
whether or not this was actually the case.
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He would rather decide on the side of caution, rather than on
the side of answering to the public opinion of Taft-Hartley. He
didn't go by polls. He used to say, "What would Moses have done
if he had taken a poll in his day?"
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And you told me that you were ac-
tually with President Truman the day after the seizure. What do
you remember about that experience?
MR. KAYLE: It's interesting. I am not sure whether it was in
the Oval Office, or in the Cabinet Room, but this was the day after
the seizure had been announced, and the word came through that
Ben Fairless was not opening the gates of U. S. Steel, and with an
impish look on his face, because you have to keep in mind, Charles
Sawyer was a Republican, probably one of the most conservative
men in the cabinet, and with an impish look on his face, the Presi-
dent said, "I called Charlie Sawyer, and I told him to fire Ben
Fairless."
(Laughter.)
MR. KAYLE: Of course that is the humor in the situation, but
he got a kick out of it.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Let me move to Ken Hechler, be-
cause you were also a special assistant in the White House. You
spent much of your life writing about Harry S. Truman.
What was Truman's theory about the presidency generally
when it came to handling crises like the steel crisis in 1952?
MR. HECHLER: I think that you can understand and appre-
ciate President Truman's action in the Steel Seizure Case by re-
viewing his theory of the presidency.
I remember the first day I went to work for President Truman,
he took me aside and said, "Just remember this, that the rich and
powerful people in the country have their own lawyers, their own
accountants, their own lobbyists, and their own special interest
groups working for them full time. It is our job to make sure that
those who are otherwise unrepresented are represented. The
president of the United States is the only public official elected by
all the people in all 48 states, and he is the chief lobbyist for the
people."
If you go back over many of President Truman's decisions that
were made prior to the Steel Seizure Case in 1952, starting with
the dropping of the two bombs to end the war against Japan,
which was done without consultation with Congress, the firing of
General MacArthur, the executive orders that he issued to deseg-
regate the Armed Forces and to make sure there was no discrimi-
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nation in federal employment, and Truman's actions in June 1950
at the start of the Korean war, you see how he viewed the power of
the presidency.
Averell Harriman was taking the position that we ought to get a
resolution from the Congress before going into Korea. President
Truman felt that that would diminish the power of the presidency,
and so he went ahead and went directly to the United Nations.
There are many, many other examples.
On his tenth birthday, Harry Truman received from his mother
a four-volume work entitled Great Men and Famous Women.
Truman was a voracious reader. He read every word of those
books, and from them he derived an opinion of the strengths and
weaknesses of American presidents.
He knew all about Buchanan and Pierce prior to the Civil War.
He also got a great kick out of Teddy Roosevelt, who wanted to
send the Navy around the world. Roosevelt said that "Since Con-
gress won't support that, I have got enough money to send them
halfway around the world. If Congress wants to leave them there,
well, that's their business."
(Laughter.)
MR. HECHLER: President Truman was determined to be a
leader, to be a strong president, and this is of course on reason
why he took the action which he did in the Steel Seizure case.
He never agonized over any of his presidential decisions. He
was eager to get out of a crisis and come to a conclusion and a de-
cision.
He never met a crisis he didn't like, and he always confronted it
with a great decision. This is the backdrop.
Could I comment just a minute on your excellent interview with
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Ken?
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Sure.
MR. HECHLER: I was interested in what the Chief Justice
said about public opinion having an effect on the Corps, you know.
Those of us who have read Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley,
that the Court follows the election returns, now know from the
Chief Justice, himself, that public opinion does make a difference.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: I think he was implying it doesn't
any more to the Supreme Court. It did back then.
MR. HECHLER: Another thing he said, which was the key to
what was going to come in the Court decision, was he repeated the
stupid remark which Holmes Baldridge made to the Court, that
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there is no limit on the inherent powers of the president, was a red
flag to the Court to stop that kind of nonsense.
That was a stupid argument to make before the District Court,
and it resonated before the Supreme Court.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And let me just jump back for one
second, Ken, to Milton Kayle.
Milton, just to make clear for the audience, in terms of the ad-
vice that President Truman was getting from his military advi-
sors, he really did feel strongly that this was going to endanger
American troops, didn't he?
MR. KAYLE: No question about that.
MR. HECHLER: Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett? He was
Republican, too, wasn't he?
MR. KAYLE: I think so.
MR. HECHLER: Anyway, Secretary Lovett made it quite
clear, that it was just like a bombing raid, to disrupt the steel com-
ing in.
I want to add just one more thing, if I have the time, about
presidential power.
Milton Kayle, Dick Neustadt, Harold Enarson, Dave Stowe,
Dave Bell and many of the people involved in this Steel Seizure
Case, were all alumni of the U. S. Bureau of the Budget. The U.
S. Bureau of the Budget, the predecessor to the present Office of
Management of Budget, is not a number crunching agency.
It is an agency that in 1939 was made part of the Executive Of-
fice of the President. All staff of the Bureau of the Budget, before
they went over to the White House, were imbued with the sense of
the tremendous power of the presidency, beyond what is in Article
II of the Constitution and what the human beings make out of
that office, and what Harry Truman made out of that office. The
fact that so many of our Budget alumni were on the White House
staff helped to support the attitude of President Truman toward
presidential power.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And Ken, lots of the press ac-
counts described him then as bull-headed and stubborn.
Would you say that's an accurate description of Harry Truman?
MR. HECHLER: I would use the word "principled," rather
than stubborn and bull-headed.
(Laughter.)
MR. HECHLER: He had real principles that he followed. He
frequently quoted the preamble to Constitution, "We, the people of
the United States, in order to form a more perfect union," and the
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very first principle which followed, "establish justice," and by jus-
tice, he meant, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, "equal rights for
all, special privileges for none." Truman was a man of principle.
This was particularly evidenced in his position on civil rights,
where he refused to accept the southern segregationist committee
chairmen in Congress as the people that were going to solve the
problem of our racial relations. Through executive orders, and
through the use of great presidential power, he was able to not
only desegregate the Armed Forces, but also eliminate discrimina-
tion in the federal establishment.
Truman set the real blueprint for what Martin Luther King
eventually put into effect in the 1960s after the Selma march. So
to answer your question very directly, President Truman had a
real theory of the presidency which certainly affected the way that
he acted, and he felt it was necessary to act in the way that he did
in the steel seizure case in 1952.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And let me move to David Feller
now, because you worked along-side Arthur Goldberg, later a Su-
preme Court Justice, in the negotiations between the union and
the steel companies, trying to reach a settlement before the Su-
preme Court got involved in it, so tell us about that a little bit, Mr.
Feller.
MR. FELLER: Well, basically, everybody thinks there was a
labor dispute. There wasn't. There was a price dispute. Remem-
ber, the steel industry then was quite different from the steel in-
dustry today. It had what it thought was a protected market, and
it could price steel at almost any price without affecting demand
very much.
The only limit was price control.
We had price control in 1952. Though everybody recognized
that the steelworkers hadn't had an increase since 1950, and given
the rise of the cost of living, were entitled to a substantial one, the
steel companies made no effort to make any deal at all during the
negotiations unless it was agreed beforehand that they would get
a price increase that was not permitted under the then-existing
price regulations. So in all the negotiations that took place until
December 31st, when the contract expired, there were no negotia-
tions, literally none. There was no offer of any kind by the indus-
try, even what they acknowledged was due to the union. The ba-
sic fight was between the companies and the government. The
steel companies wanted a larger price increase and the price ad-
ministrator at that time said they were entitled to nothing, or a
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couple of dollars a ton. So until they had satisfaction on the price
side, there would be no offer on the wage and benefits side. There
were no negotiations, essentially, until the contract was about to
expire.
Phil Murray, who then was president, was determined not to
submit the dispute to any board. It was his view that if you sub-
mitted a dispute to the board, a board would come out with a com-
promise. Then you would have to go on strike to get the compro-
mise, and then you would have to compromise against the com-
promise. So he believed you might as well go straight at it. Ar-
thur Goldberg, who was then General Counsel, practically re-
signed, because he was urging that we submit the dispute to the
Wage Stabilization Board, as the President had asked, and Phil
Murray said no.
Then Phil got on a train to go back to Pittsburgh. Before he did
that, he called the executive board of the union together in Wash-
ington and got them to call a convention, a special convention to
be held in January, after the strike began, to decide what to do
about any presidential request to submit the dispute to the Wage
Stabilization Board, in effect, tying his hands so that he couldn't
agree.
Something happened on the train ride back to Pittsburgh, or
shortly after, because he was finally persuaded--against what had
been his earlier judgment--to agree to submit the dispute to the
Wage Stabilization Board and not call a strike at the end of the
contract, as was customary in the steel industry at that time, and
that's how we ended up where we were.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And just before the Supreme Court
takes the case, there were real negotiations going on in the White
House, were there not, that you were privy to?
MR. FELLER: What happened was that after Judge Pine set
aside the seizure and said that it was unconstitutional, the case
went to the Court of Appeals when the government asked for a
stay of Judge Pine's order. The steel companies' motion asked for
an injunction against the Secretary of Commerce making any
changes in wages, hours, and working conditions.
You understand, when you talk about the government seizing
the steel mills, that nothing happened. They just raised the flag.
The steel mills continued to operate and were run by the same
people, run by the same people, selling the same way, getting their
money the same way. Nothing happened except the flag went up,
but the flag went up and Phil Murray wasn't going to strike
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against the government. You don't strike against the flag, and so
the workers continued to work.
The only prod to negotiations was the power that the Secretary
of Commerce had to change wages and hours in accordance with
what the Wage Stabilization Board had recommended.
Well, when the Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the Secretary
from making any changes, the day after the president called the
parties together at the White House and said, "The Secretary of
Commerce is about to make some changes."
He didn't say what they were.
He said, "Neither party is going to like what we are going to do,
but we are going to do something," That broke the dam and the
parties negotiated for the first time. I wasn't there. I was at the
Steelworkers office on Jackson Place just around the corner.
Arthur was there. He called up and said, "Start drafting; we are
going to settle," and we started drafting clauses for the settlement.
Then the Supreme Court intervened. The companies had filed a
petition for cert, and they asked for and received an order prevent-
ing the Secretary of Commerce from making any changes in terms
and conditions.
When that order came down, Arthur got on the phone and said,
"Well, the Supreme Court has stopped it. It's over."
There never would have been a Supreme Court case if the com-
panies had not gotten that order staying the Secretary of Com-
merce from making changes in the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, because in fact, the dispute was settled. We were at the
drafting stage, putting together the words to settle it. The Su-
preme Court, when it issued that order, just took away all incen-
tives from the companies to settle, and so we went on to the Su-
preme Court case.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And you told me when we talked
over the phone that this was the case the Supreme Court should
not have taken.
MR. FELLER: Well, if they hadn't put that additional condi-
tion on, if they had done what the Court of Appeals had done and
said, "Okay, we will hear the case, but we will allow the parties to
negotiate in the meantime," we would have settled it, and there
never would have been a case. They could have granted cert or
not granted cert, but the case would have been moot.
There would have been a settlement.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Why do you think, looking back on
it now after all these years, that the Supreme Court got involved?
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MR. FELLER: I don't know. Why did they get involved in
Gore versus Bush?
(Laughter.)
MR. FELLER: The same answer.
(Laughter and applause.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Now, I am going to keep -- the av-
erage age of our panel over here is 85, so I have given them a little
extra time.
MR. FELLER: I am a little older than the average.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Yes, you are over the average to-
day, so I have given them a little extra time, based on their matur-
ity, but we are going to move to the youth over here a little bit for
awhile.
Stanley Temko, you were on the team of lawyers for U. S. Steel
on the side of industry who worked on the case from the start.
You actually filed the cert petition in the Supreme Court.
There were a number of companies involved, as we saw from the
video, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, after whom it was captioned,
Bethlehem Steel, but U. S. Steel really took the lead in this case.
First, tell me about the arguments in District Court that we
heard reference to.
MR. TEMKO: Well, arguments in the District Court are not
crucial in any number of lawsuits. The briefs, and even the oral
arguments, don't affect the outcome very much.
Here, the District Court proceedings were key to the outcome of
the case. The District Court proceedings, particularly the ap-
proach taken by the government, were what led Pine to his deci-
sion invalidating the seizure. I don't think the government ever
caught up with that after Pine went to the heart of the case and
just said the seizure was unconstitutional.
As in some earlier reference, the general editorial comment, and
so forth, was great, and it seemed we had a lot of momentum.
Now, what happened in the District Court?
Probably the most singular thing was the oral argument of At-
torney General Holmes Baldridge, who argued for the government
and took the most extreme position you could have ever seen. It
was their position that there was no power in the courts to re-
strain the President in any way.
They argued that Secretary Sawyer was the alter ego of the
President, and neither the President nor Sawyer would be subject
to any type of injunctive order.
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Now, Mr. Baldridge kept repeating this during the oral argu-
ment time and again, with no qualifications. To put it very
graphically, Judge Pine said, "Well, Mr. Baldridge, what if I -- if
Secretary Sawyer said, 'Arrest me today and execute me tomor-
row.' What is my way to attack that or seek relief?'
Baldridge answered, "There are only two things: Impeachment
or the ballot box." So here you have the people sitting in the court,
and there was a bit of amusement going around the Court, but the
government position was quite telling.
Baldridge never -- never caught up with that.
There was another reason for the Government's problems. Mil-
ton had said that they never thought you should have gotten to
the merits on this, and certainly, in the normal way you would try
a case on this, all you would be arguing about is whether you
should have an injunction of some sort and set a later argument or
some kind of hearing on the merits.
First of all, the Government, in written briefs, made that point
that this was just a preliminary matter. But about eight years ear-
lier, there had been a pretty famous case called the United States
versus Montgomery Ward.
Some of you, the older people, may remember Sewell Avery be-
ing carried out of the Montgomery Ward offices in his chair by the
federal marshals.
Well, the government had won that in the Court of Appeals. It
never went to the Supreme Court.
The case was mooted, but the Government had argued there,
that not only was there a statutory basis for its action, but they
argued the same inherent power of the government to do this.
Since time was of the essence because the case was moving so
quickly, the government pretty much copied this whole Montgom-
ery Ward brief in the District Court. If you had someone like
Judge Pine, who wanted to bite the bullet and decide the case on
the merits, here were 40 pages of argument on the actual question
he decided.
Then Baldridge carried it on with the very extreme position,
then Judge Pine having the case was fortuitous for us. One other
judge had been approached prior to Judge Pine. You have two
types of judges, Judge Pine, who wants to bite the bullet and isn't
afraid of anyone, and a number of judges, who figure, if it's sort of
a tough case, maybe someone else should look at it. So one of the
judges whom we went to before Judge Pine said, well, it wouldn't
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affect him, but his wife had 20 or 30 shares of steel company stock,
and he wouldn't want to be subject to any criticism.
(Laughter.)
MR. TEMKO: Well, both the government and the steel compa-
nies said, "Your Honor, that's fine."
And the judge said, "Well, I know that, but I want to be above
reproach, so why don't you take it down the hall," and Judge Pine
took the case. He was a crusty fellow, afraid of no one. I am not
sure, but I think Pine was not sort of a present day Supreme
Court law clerk, but that he had worked for either Justice Suther-
land or Van Dervanter, who were pretty conservative fellows.
Judge Pine took the case, and he relished it.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And tell us a little bit about actu-
ally filing the case in the Supreme Court.
MR. TEMKO: Well, that was sort of fun in one way. We knew
the government, which had lost on the merits had to go through
the Court of Appeals, but clearly, both sides thought the case
would go to the Supreme Court, and under the Supreme Court
rules, either side, the successful side or the losing side, could peti-
tion for certiorari.
Now, we knew that the government would petition, but every-
one was feeling pretty good at this point and we were following the
favorable press. We thought that we had, I guess, what they
would today call the big "Mo." We had some momentum and so
the powers that be, who were all meeting in the Hotel Carlton in
Washington, said, "Let's beat the government to the punch, and
let's file ahead of them." I was junior, and there was another jun-
ior fellow who represented Bethlehem, and the two of us worked
in the Covington offices all night and wrote the petition. Then
early in the morning we went over to the Carlton, and they opened
the barbershop early so we could get a shave, and then we went up
to --
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Yes. I was wondering why you
look so nice in that picture up there.
MR. TEMKO: We got the pictures. That was something. John
Pickering and I had written the petition, but the senior man with
us was the Cravath partner, Bruce Bromly, who also represented
Time Magazine and a number of newspapers, so he knew that he
was going to have his picture taken at the Court. Being a real
gentleman, he said, "You fellows wrote this; come up and get your
picture taken with me," and so we did.
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Now, our filing ahead of the Government for certiorari had one
amusing repercussion.
Under the Supreme Court rules, as they then existed, the first
party to file for certiorari had the right to open and close the case.
So we were the first one to file and had the right to open and close.
We had beaten the government by a few hours. But then
Perlman, who was the Solicitor General and acting Attorney Gen-
eral, wrote a letter to the Supreme Court, saying, "This isn't fair;
we really lost below, and we want to have the right to open and
close." Chief Justice Vinson wrote back and said, "No, the rules
are not that way," so the steel companies had the right to open
and close, but then later on, a few years later, the Supreme Court
changed the rule.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: All right. I think Ken Hechler has
a question for you.
MR. TEMKO: All right.
MR. HECHLER: Stan, would you agree with me that Holmes
Baldridge made just about the stupidest blunder in history when
he came out with this crazy idea that the President has absolutely
unlimited power, and that may have resonated in the Supreme
Court, too?
MR. TEMKO: It was one of the worst arguments and worst po-
sitions.
(Laughter.)
MR. TEMKO: You would think that they had an awful lot of
smart people down there, but I don't think they had that many
really brilliant people talking about this at that time.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Let me ask you, Stanley: Were
you viewed as a bad guy by your family and friends?
Obviously there were thousands of union workers across the
country that supported what President Truman did, specifically
here in Pittsburgh.
MR. TEMKO: No. Actually, this wasn't divisive. I have, over
the years, represented people who would be considered malefac-
tors and had some concerns, but we had no trouble about the steel
case.
We were sort of fighting for the rights of the people and for the
Constitution, and it went pretty much that way.
We had no problem at all.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Let me jump back to David Feller,
because you were present for the oral arguments.
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You couldn't remember if you were actually at counsel table --
MR. FELLER: No. I --
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: -- with Professor Goldberg or not?
MR. FELLER: I don't think I was. The counsel table was kind
of crowded.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Well, what do you remember about
the argument in this --
MR. FELLER: Well --
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: -- in the Supreme Court?
MR. FELLER: Well, I attended all of the arguments from
Judge Pine up. Phil Perlman, who argued for the government in
the Supreme Court, was absolutely magnificent in the Court of
Appeals when the question of the stay was there. He commanded
that courtroom, and he really was just brilliant.
It was absolutely the opposite in the Supreme Court. Somehow,
being in the Supreme Court kind of humbled him, and it was a
very poor argument.
John W. Davis, a very distinguished former presidential candi-
date, a very honored man, read his argument for the companies.
He read it beautifully, but the rules say you are not supposed to do
that. He was treated with extraordinary deference. There are
very few lawyers who are treated as well by the Court as John W.
Davis was treated, and Phil Perlman got exactly the opposite
treatment.
Then Arthur got up. The position of the Steelworkers in the
Supreme Court was interesting. We didn't support either side.
We filed a brief saying essentially, "Look, if you think this is a la-
bor dispute, you are wrong. It isn't. It is a dispute about prices.
The steel companies are using the union as a club to get a price
increase. The one thing we do want to tell you is, please, decide
this case quickly, because before the seizure, we could bargain
with the companies.
After the seizure, we could bargain with the government. But
when you issued an order saying we couldn't do that, we had no-
body to bargain with, so decide it one way or the other.
If the government loses, we will bargain with the steel compa-
nies. If the government wins, we will bargain with the govern-
ment. But in the meantime, we have got nobody to bargain with.
We are still working at 1950 wages and paying 1952 prices, so de-
cide quickly."
We won. They decided quickly.
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(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: They did indeed decide quickly. It
was June 2nd. All of this happened very swiftly.
You were in the courtroom of the Supreme Court when the deci-
sion was handed down. Tell us about that.
MR. FELLER: Yes. I was sitting in the courtroom with Ar-
thur. Justice Black started. His opinion was fairly short, but it
was quite clear how he was going to come out. Arthur whispered
to me "Get up and call Phil Murray."
I had had a secretary holding a public phone open, because I
knew I'd need it. So before the other Justices even got to give
their opinions, I was on the phone and got to Howard Hague and
to Phil Murray.
Phil couldn't believe the Supreme Court had set aside the Presi-
dent's order. It just seemed inconceivable, but I told him -- I as-
sured him that it was so and hung up. I am told that the strike
started seven minutes later.
I think the strikes probably started before the last Justice had
finished reading his opinion in the Supreme Court.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And Milton Kayle, you know a lit-
tle bit about, there was supposedly a dinner shortly after that at
Justice Black's house -- it's hard to imagine now -- but where the
Justices invited President Truman over.
What do you remember about that?
MR. KAYLE: Well, it's interesting. Charlie Murphy called me
and said, "Milton, the President is going to have dinner tomorrow
night at Justice Black's home with all the other Justices. I would
like you to put down on one side the -- on one sheet of paper what
was wrong with that decision."
Well, you can imagine. Here I was, four years out of law school.
I -- and the most desirable thing is to work as a clerk for a Judge
at the Supreme Court level, wonderful, but at the federal level or
state level, great.
Here I was, putting words in the mouth of the President to tell
off the whole Court.
(Laughter.)
MR. KAYLE: What I -- I was able to say basically is that the
Supreme Court substituted for the President's judgment the seri-
ousness of the cessation of production of steel at this particular
time, and basically, that pretty much was what the essence of the
decision was.
702 Vol. 41
Summer 2003 Transcript of Steel Seizure Retrospective
A number of biographers recorded that the President did go to
Justice Black's home the next day, and what he said was, "I don't
like your law, but this is mighty good bourbon."
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And Ken Hechler, one of the dis-
senters who wrote the chief dissenting opinion was Chief Justice
Vinson, who remained loyal to Truman to the very end, and a lot
of people joked that that was so because they played poker to-
gether regularly, but how close were Vinson and President Tru-
man?
MR. HECHLER: Very, very close. As a matter of fact, I think
next to General George Catlett Marshall that President Truman
regarded Fred Vinson as being the greatest living American, and
he had tremendous respect for him, and President Truman's
daughter, Margaret, always used to call Fred Vinson "Poppa Vin."
The Vinsons were practically members of the family. When Mil-
ton and I were down at Key West in late 1951, President Truman
had Chief Justice Vinson and Mrs. Vinson there to try to persuade
Fred Vinson to run for president on the Democratic ticket in 1952.
This was an offer which was turned down, because Fred Vinson
was not in very good health and actually died in 1953. In 1947,
when President Truman became the first president to address the
NAACP at the Lincoln Memorial, he called Fred Vinson and asked
him to come along with him to that speech.
The two of them were almost like soul brothers, because they
came from adjoining states. Kentucky, of course, is a Common-
wealth, and Kentucky is right next to Missouri.
They both came from states that had a large number of slaves
before the Civil War. They began to talk to each other about how
to restore the rights of African Americans after the reconstruction
period when the KKK started its lynchings. Vinson, when he got
on the Court, issued a large number of decisions which paved the
way to Earl Warren's landmark decision in 1954, Brown versus
the Board of Education. The two men were extremely close, Mil-
ton, you don't play poker, do you?
MR. KAYLE: Not really.
MR. HECHLER: Well, I am even less than that, but I used to
enjoy kibitzing at these poker games where Vinson and Truman
were at the poker table. Poker to Harry Truman was not just a
game.
He would frequently bring in prospective cabinet appointees and
tell us, "Rib this guy and see if he has a thick enough skin that he
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can withstand the barbs of the press, and that he has a sense of
humor. We don't want any sourpusses working for us."
Anyway, one day, right before lunch, they had been playing a
poker hand. They interrupted it for lunch. After lunch, they came
back, and they both discovered that there were five aces in the
pack while they were playing.
I will always remember Fred Vinson saying -- you know, he is a
very somber sort of an individual.
Time Magazine once described Vinson as a -- as a sheep with a
hangover. He said in a very low-key way, "What would the people
of the United States of America think if they knew that the Presi-
dent of the United States and the Chief Justice were playing poker
with five aces?"
(Laughter.)
MR. HIECHLER: These two men were very, very close and
very respectful of each other, and Truman really wanted Vinson as
President to succeed him.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And in contrast, was there a sense
of anger by President Truman towards his appointees who did not
vote for him in the Steel Seizure Case?
MR. HECHLER: Oh, boy.
(Laughter.)
MR. HECHLER: There was blue smoke around the White
House for a couple of days. Even though President Truman ac-
cepted the decision, I don't think he ever forgave Justice Tom
Clark. He once remarked that Tom Clark was one of his worst
appointees.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And let me switch now to John
Barrett, talking about the Justices, because Justice Black obvi-
ously wrote the majority opinion, but the most famous is the con-
currence by Justice Jackson, and you have now had access, in
working on his biography, to many papers that have not seen the
light of day until now.
What was the relationship like between Jackson and Harry
Truman, and why was this a particularly problematic case for
Jackson?
MR. BARRETT: Well, in 1952, as this case came to the Su-
preme Court, Jackson looked at the government's position and
realized that although many of the precedents being invoked for
inherent executive power were Franklin Roosevelt, these were
really episodes in which Robert Jackson, as Roosevelt's attorney
general, had been the legal thinker and defender, and so in a
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sense, he thought that Truman's administration was, in its litiga-
tion, trying to pin this Steel Seizure on him, and in his concurring
opinion, which sort of carries the force of history because it has the
three-part analysis that the Chief Justice referred to, and also be-
cause it is just much more detailed and more beautifully written
than Justice Black's opinion, Jackson is doing a fair amount of
rebutting that general accusation, and I think what he is saying,
in addition to the doctrine, is that the Truman administration,
and trying to say, just like you did, was wrong.
It was fundamentally wrong in four respects.
The first thing he, in his opinion, does is review the various
FDR episodes, the destroyer deal in Great Britain in August of
1940, the seizure of an aviation plant in California in 1941, the
seizure of foreign vessels that were in American harbors when the
war broke out in early 1942, and in each of those instances, Jack-
son, in his dissenting -- in his concurring opinion points to the
President's, meaning Roosevelt's, use of congressionally granted
power or reference of questions to Congress, in other words, not
going out on some notion of his own inherent power.
Secondly, and frankly and candidly and somewhat offendedly,
Jackson, in his concurring opinion, says, "The Truman admini-
stration invoking these precedents is mistaking aggressive advo-
cacy, which I, Robert Jackson, did as Attorney General with con-
stitutional law, and so even if these episodes are on all fours, as
lawyers would say, they are the same thing.
"I defended it then, because it was my job as a lawyer, but it is
wrong constitutionally."
Third, Jackson thought the Truman administration was wrong
in its presentation in the quality of its argumentation.
Jackson, himself, had been Solicitor General for two years be-
fore he became Roosevelt's Attorney General.
In the words of Justice Brandeis, he was the best ever and
should have been Solicitor General for life, and in looking at the
arguments, former Solicitor General John W. Davis against cur-
rent Solicitor General Philip Perlman thought Jackson something
of an SG snob, was none too impressed by the current Solicitor
General's performance.
One of the little tidbits in the Jackson papers are the notes that
Justice Frankfurter scribbled to Jackson and passed to him during
the oral arguments, which covered two days, and these are Frank-
furter writings, but these are simpatico colleagues, and I think it
is a little glimpse of Jackson's perspective, too.
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One, though, which I think has to refer to Perlman and Davis
simply says, "Why does an elephant try engagements with an au-
thenticated greyhound?"
(Laughter.)
MR. BARRETT: Another note, watching Davis, and I think
anticipating a trap, says, "I suspect Davis designedly let SG enter
that door, and we will deal with it on rebuttal."
A third note, referring to the Chief Justice occupying the center
chair, Fred Vinson, says -- this is Frankfurter -- "This strange cen-
ter man carries on a running commentary to Hugo," meaning Jus-
tice Black, "answering Davis, Davis, God, as if Davis was unan-
swerable," and certainly from Jackson's perspective, Perlman
wasn't doing any answering.
Jackson also at the end of the day, the second day, wrote a letter
to his son, who was a lawyer in New York, and this was his quick
summary of the oral arguments.
"The steel argument ended, Davis, venerable and magnificent,
Perlman struggling and confused, the Court, weary. It is a subject
I have struggled with in several capacities," and then probably
getting to the bottom line, "probably means we won't adjourn for
the summer as early as hoped."
(Laughter.)
MR. BARRETT: A fourth respect in which Jackson, I think,
said the Truman administration was wrong was in its equating of
presidents, in viewing what it was up to in 1952 as on a par with
the historical episodes it was invoking. Jackson's opinion refers to
FDR, obviously, and also refers to Wilson before him, hero Democ-
rat presidents, from Jackson's perspective. It also interestingly
refers to the Tudor kings and queens of England and says what
they all did right in expansively exercising executive powers was
finding a way to stop short of provoking the judicial test, which
obviously the Truman administration, maybe assisted by Judge
Pine, had not done.
Now, as to the two men, Truman and Jackson had friendly rela-
tions.
As Attorney General, Jackson had given Senator Truman the
key committee counsel, which made the Truman committee inves-
tigation of defense pricing so successful, and Truman was always
grateful to Jackson for that.
Truman was the President who send Robert Jackson to Nurem-
burg to represent America and the victorious Allies in the prosecu-
tion of the principal Nazi leaders, but in Jackson's eyes, I think it
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is fair to say, Harry Truman came to occupy the office, but was
never the President, which was to Robert Jackson then and al-
ways Franklin D. Roosevelt, and this is a diary entry that Jackson
jotted after meeting with Truman.
Jackson's deputy, Wild Bill Donovan, and he go to the Oval Of-
ice, and they meet with President Truman June 15, 1945, as Nur-
emberg is getting off the ground, and Jackson writes, "I never be-
fore realized how completely FDR had set in my mind the pattern
of the presidential office.
"As we were waiting to keep our appointment, the President,
himself, walked into the outer office and greeted everybody pre-
sent, opening the door for everyone to come into his private office.
"Never having seen a President walk into the outer office, I was
somewhat startled, and he walked out again with us as we left."
That gap between Harry Truman and the President is some-
thing of what I think Robert Jackson's view of this case is about.
All of those dimensions are present in Jackson's disagreement.
His opinion has great analysis and legal vision. It also obvi-
ously is explicitly biographical about Jackson's own legal work in
the Roosevelt administration.
It is also candid and very directly self-justified about Jackson's
work in the Roosevelt administration, and it is critical of Truman
for letting this legal issue get to this point.
Jackson's opinion concludes by describing the vast accretion of
power that has come to the office of the presidency, and the not
subtle implication of that is that with all of that, a President
should have been able to handle this situation without provoking
this litigation.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And did this whole episode leave
any mark on Jackson?
Did he ever talk about it in later years?
MR. BARRETT: Well, this is June of 1952.
Jackson lives less than two more years, but he, hearing
Perlman, having exchanges with Perlman during the oral argu-
ment about what the Roosevelt administration had done, working
on this case leads Jackson to a sort of striking realization, which is
that Roosevelt events only eleven years earlier involve people, and
Jackson is the last surviving participant, and so beginning liter-
ally days after the Steel Seizure Case was decided, Jackson sat
down to do something that he intended to do since 1945 or so,
which is to write a memoir of Franklin Roosevelt, and this is a
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project that he pursued and he got quite some distance on, but
never completed.
It is a document that then was in a family desk drawer for about
45 years and now has been entrusted to me, and with editing and
some introductory work soon will be a book, Robert Jackson's
memoir of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: I will be hosting a book signing
here in nineteen -- in 2003 or 2004.
MR. BARRETT: It's a date.
DR. MARCUS: Can I just add something to what John said --
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Sure.
DR. MARCUS: -- because I love the exchanges that were made
in the different courts, and I like using the same words. Being a
historian, I love words.
In the argument before the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson ac-
tually said to Philip Perlman, "I am afraid that you are going to
lay much of the Steel Seizure at my doorstep."
And Perlman said, "The government does lay a lot of it at your
door."
"Perhaps that was right," Jackson confessed. "I claimed every-
thing, of course, like every other attorney general. It was a cus-
tom that did not leave the Department of Justice when I did" --
(Laughter.)
DR. MARCUS: -- so I think that is indicative of his feeling.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Maeva Marcus, Dr. Marcus is the
author of the leading definitive work on the Steel Seizure Case,
and so let me ask you, Maeva, what did the government do wrong
in the Steel Seizure Case? Was it bad advice from the advisors, as
many like to say?
DR. MARCUS: I don't actually think so. I think you have to
divide the advice on two levels.
I think the advice that wasn't good was the advice he got from
people like Secretary of Defense Lovett on the extent of the emer-
gency and the need for steel.
I believe that President Truman accepted this advice. He didn't
go out and do research to find out if all of these numbers were cor-
rect. They told him they needed steel and that any interruption --
that means any -- any amount of time, and this was what was so
important when the Justices said, "Oh, President Truman could
have used three different statutes to seize the steel mills." In
Truman's mind, he couldn't use them, because, for example, the
Selective Service procedure, the Defense Production Act, all in-
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volved very cumbersome administrative actions in courts all over
the United States, and it would take too long to implement. I
learned that the minute a strike is called, the steel companies
bank the furnaces, and it takes more than a week to bring them
up again, so at the mere mention of a strike, you have an interrup-
tion in production, and Truman's advisors were saying, "We can't
tolerate that," and that is why Truman acted.
He knew with Taft-Hartley, you had to call a Board of Inquiry
before you had the cooling off period.
If you called the Board of Inquiry, it took a couple of days to ob-
tain the injunction, you had a strike again.
Moreover, he knew that the Steelworkers had negotiated in
good faith with the government, had tried to get a settlement, had
worked under an old contract for months, and he believed that the
seizure was the right thing to do for them, not because he was pro
labor, but from a sense of fairness, and so he did seize the steel
mills, and he hoped to use the threat of a wage increase to reach a
settlement.
He never did raise wages, but he hoped to use the threat to
bring the companies to the negotiating table.
Now, where I think the government went wrong is in its legal
strategy and arguments.
I think those were a terrible problem, yet some of what hap-
pened was serendipitous.
The first hearing before a Federal District Judge was before
Alexander Holtzoff, when the steel industry asked for a temporary
restraining order, and Judge Holtzoff said, "I can't do that."
"When you ask for a temporary restraining order, I must weigh
the equities, and it is the public interest, as explained by Presi-
dent Truman and the government against what the steel compa-
nies' claim will be irreparable harm," and Holtzoff could not figure
out what the irreparable harm would be. He also said he didn't
think the Court had the power to enjoin an action of the President,
and so he didn't issue a temporary restraining order, but when the
companies went back, and you heard the story about getting
Judge Pine instead of Judge Walter Bastion.
I mean, that's serendipity.
We don't know what another judge might have done, so the ar-
gument was before Judge Pine, and it was on a motion for pre-
liminary injunction, and this is for all of you young lawyers here




The government legal team was led at that time by the Solicitor
General, there was no Attorney General.
A Solicitor General usually doesn't argue at a lower court, but
the case was considered so important that an assistant attorney
general, Holmes Baldridge, argued the case, and he was the head
of the Claims Division, and he knew nothing about -- not nothing,
but very little about constitutional law and was very ill prepared
to argue, yet he went into the District Court, and the motion in
opposition to the injunction request emphasized the wrong things.
What the government should have emphasized was the equities
-- there was no irreparable harm, as David Feller said.
The seizure was nothing but putting the American flag up on
every company's flag pole.
The companies ran the companies as they always did. They
kept separate books.
They had no harm. They loved the seizure. They went out and
made a big public relations thing about this, but nothing hap-
pened to them.
This was great. They didn't have to increase wages.
They were making lots of money, and the seizure could have
gone on for years until the Korean War ended, as far as they were
concerned, from the point of view of profit.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And so why, though, Maeva, why
did the Supreme Court decide as it did?
DR. MARCUS: Well, the Supreme Court decided as it did, I
think, for a variety of reasons, and I think the hearing before
Judge Pine is one, though I have to tell you that the government
did change its argument.
It did not say any of the things that you heard were said before
Judge Pine. But I would like to tell you what Holmes Baldridge
said in the district court, in addition to what Stanley Temko told
you about Holmes Baldridge being executed the next morning.
Baldridge simply didn't understand the Constitutional argu-
ments and he absolutely scandalized Judge Pine by his comments.
At the end of his argument, Judge Pine said, "Well, what do you
want to say?"
Baldridge asked for two extra minutes. In his two extra min-
utes, he said, "The administration took action because there was
an emergency, and someone had to do something."
And Judge Pine said, "Well, that sounded like an argument for
expediency."
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And Baldridge replied, "But we say the expediency is backed by
power.
(Laughter.)
DR. MARCUS: Well, that just blew Judge Pine's mind and up-
set all the newspapers and everyone else across the country. It
really was most unfortunate, because I have to tell you, the day
after the seizure was announced, the country was evenly divided
in favor of President Truman and against.
They were not against it. They bought what he had to say in his
speech but Baldridge's remarks changed public opinion. As for the
Supreme Court, what did they do?
Their ruling was a real surprise.
There were two decades of unprecedented employment of execu-
tive power. All the Supreme Court Justices were Truman and
Roosevelt appointees, and everyone expected that really, that
Court would uphold the presidential action, so why didn't the
Court uphold the action?
I think there are many reasons for this.
One is that the prospect of many years of international crisis
encouraged the Justices to think that the time had come for a
careful examination of the powers of the President to take emer-
gency action in a time of national security.
The Justices were influenced by the events of World War II, the
rise of fascist governments and the resulting horrors, and they
thought it wasn't untimely to reaffirm first principles of govern-
ment, though these had not stood in the way of any other Court
decisions upholding presidential power when the Court was con-
vinced that the action was necessary.
The Court also revealed belief in the necessity for a firm founda-
tion in law for all government action, including that of the Presi-
dent.
They were afraid that the United States was now involved in
the Korean conflict because of a presidential commitment of troops
with no declaration of war.
It was the President, not Congress, who had declared the na-
tional emergency after hostilities had begun in Korea.
Now the President was asserting the power to seize steel mills
to avert a strike whose effects might harm the United States in
Korea.
I think that train of events led to the Justices' decision, and the
Court had the luxury of ruling against the President because it
wasn't convinced of the emergency.
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Few believed the strike would be as harmful as the administra-
tion claimed. There were newspaper attacks from the time that
the mills were seized until the decision that talked about the re-
lease of steel for recreational activities, for bowling alleys, for race
tracks, for bicycles, for whatever.
There seemed to be plenty of steel on hand, and this became
common knowledge in those two months, and so the Court felt,
reflecting the public consensus, that it could reassert the ordinary
limits on presidential power, and I think that's why it did it.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And that was the theme of the
video we watched, too.
DR. MARCUS: Yes.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: There just wasn't a sense of emer-
gency. I want to jump to Judge Abner Mikva, who couldn't be
here.
As was mentioned, he had to be in Dallas, but he is a former
Congressman, a former Federal Judge, and a former White House
counsel, so I asked Judge Mikva to address in writing the impact
of the Steel Seizure Case on current issues dealing with the scope
of presidential power, and so I wanted to read that.
"The question that has been posed to me for today's program at
Duquesne University is this: 'Does the Steel Seizure Case have
any bearing on the scope of the President's power during post Sep-
tember 11th times in the United States?
'Specifically, issues have arisen with respect to the treatment of
alleged terrorists here on American soil, as well as the President's
power to initiate military action in Iraq.
"'Does Justice Jackson's famous Steel Seizure opinion that lays
out three tiers of presidential power shed any light on those issues
today?'
And this is the answer from Judge Mikva:
"On the matter of Iraq, presidents since Vietnam have been
careful to seek congressional approval where there is any question
as to their power. This is a result primarily of the War Powers
Resolution.
"Presidents have been persuaded to follow it at least in spirit.
"President Bush, the elder, did so in introducing troops in Op-
eration Desert Storm.
"George W. Bush has used it in a different fashion, using Con-
gressional approval as a mechanism to gain support from the
United Nations for the American position.
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"When it comes to Iraq" -- and this is, I think, an important dis-
tinction -- "we are squarely in the area of foreign affairs and the
President's exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief, so the
Steel Seizure Case doesn't strictly apply.
"If it were to apply, we would be in Jackson's number one cate-
gory, where the President's power is strongest.
"When it comes to the treatment of alleged terrorists on Ameri-
can soil, a different question is raised.
"The Steel Seizure Case is much more applicable here, and in
fact, my view is that President Bush actually has less power than
President Truman had in the Steel Seizure context.
"There, the issue of labor-management relations and a strike in
the critical steel industry, with a war going on in Korea, was
clearly something that one of the branches of government had the
constitutional power to deal with, whether President or Congress.
"In the present case, it is not so clear that either branch can cut
back on certain basic individual rights safeguarded by the Consti-
tution.
"Moreover, the President is dealing with domestic affairs, and
he is at low ebb under Justice Jackson's test.
"It is true that he may be acting with the assent of Congress to
the extent the Patriot Act gives him broad power to deal with ter-
rorists even on the domestic grounds, but in this area, the Consti-
tution and other statutes place additional limits on what the
President can do.
"The Steel Seizure Case suggests that the President will be on
very tenuous grounds here."
Do I want to ask Professor Barrett, you teach constitutional law
and are a Jackson scholar.
Do you agree with Judge Mikva, and what do you see as the
relevance of the Steel Seizure case in terms of presidential power
today?
MR. BARRETT: Well, the Steel Seizure case for the Truman
administration was a foreign affairs commander-in-chief wartime
case.
The explanation for the seizure of the mills is exactly the expla-
nation that an Executive Branch would give today to justify some
policy that is part of the War Against Terrorism or -- and/or mili-
tary action against Iraq, so I am not sure that there is quite so
much ground separating the two.
I do think that the Jackson typology is as the Chief Justice said,
so that's something of a precedent, the governing law, and in an
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area where Congress has not empowered the President, and in an
area where Congress has not prohibited or attempted to restrict
the President, we will be in that middle category that Justice
Jackson's opinion calls a kind of Twilight Zone, and I think Judge
Mikva is probably correct in predicting that the closer an issue is
in general public opinion to a military issue, a foreign troop re-
lated battle related issue, that much greater the chance of the
President's argument prevailing, and conversely, the closer it
looks to a domestic issue, the tougher the argument for the Presi-
dent.
The indefinite incommunicado, no counsel provided detentions
of various people are perhaps one issue right now that raises this
question that's being litigated in Circuit Courts.
Some people are captured off battle fields in Afghanistan. That
looks a lot like military activity.
One gentleman was captured at O'Hare Airport. That looks a
lot closer to domestic activity, and so the Court may begin with a
gut sense of what the issue is that it is really being asked to de-
cide.
I also would flag one comment. Maybe it wasn't meant to be sig-
nificant, but Chief Justice Rehnquist described the Steel -- the
Steel Seizure case as just one of many cases in this area.
I think that is a glimpse of the real freedom and power to decide
that Supreme Court Justices always retain, whatever the body of
precedent may be, and so they will view tomorrow's situation as
they see it.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And I want to follow up with this,
John.
It is really interesting.
In his memoirs, President Truman, himself, ends the chapter on
the Steel Seizure incident with an admonition that seems kind of
eerie when you read it today.
This is what he writes: "It is not really realistic for the Justices
of the Supreme Court to say that comprehensive power shall be
available to the President only when a war has been declared, or
the country has been invaded.
"There are no longer sharp distinctions between military targets
and the sanctuary of civilian areas, nor can we separate the eco-
nomic facts from the problems of defense and security," and that
could be President Bush's argument today, couldn't it, with re-
spect to the need to give him broader powers, because on Ameri-
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can soil, after 11 -- September 11th, one can argument that this is
a completely different terrain.
One more interesting fact that I want to share that I discovered
on the internet yesterday is that Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld wrote his senior thesis at Princeton on the Steel Seizure
case.
DR. MARCUS: Did he?
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: So clearly, the Bush administra-
tion must be looking at this very hard, this piece of history, but
one could say that although this looks a lot like what Harry Tru-
man faced, things have shifted, because we have September 11th
that is nothing like anything that came before.
MR. BARRETT: I think there's a lot of precedent.
Whatever Rumsfeld's paper concluded, there is a lot of prece-
dent for an Executive Branch to use today, even in a case that
they lost, and so Steel Seizure, particularly with the Truman for-
ward looking glass from the memoirs about war and foreign policy
being much more complicated and harder to categorize, I think we
will be hearing much more about this.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And let me just ask if any other
panelists have any comments on the application of the Steel Sei-
zure Case to events today?
Dr. Marcus?
DR. MARCUS: Well, I think it is very important.
First of all, I think simply the act of ruling against the Presi-
dent was most important. I think that changed Supreme Court
doctrine in this area.
They had shied away from acting against the President. You
always see cases titled without a President's name, and of course
this case is Youngstown v. Sawyer, the Secretary of Commerce.
But if you read all the opinions, all the opinions talk about the
President's power and what the President is doing, so I think it is
most important that the Court invalidated the seizure. The Steel
Seizure Case has been used again and again, especially during the
Nixon administration, to reach presidential acts. The Steel Sei-
zure Case showed a showed a greater willingness on the Court's
part to deal with constitutional issues, and look what came after
the Steel Seizure Case: Brown, the reapportionment cases, Powell
v. McCormick.
I think this is a very, very --
MR. BARRETT: United States versus Nixon.
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DR. MARCUS: Nixon. Well, that's one that I love, and I think
it is very, very important to what is going to happen today. I think
the way that separation of powers was treated, will have an effect
on what the Court does today
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And I can't resist asking David
Feller, because he worked on the briefs: What do you think the
impact of the steel seizure case is today or will be?
MR. FELLER: Well, I concur in the sense that it countenanced
an action against the President and has been followed in other
cases. That is very significant.
In terms of what the Court will do in terms of particular cir-
cumstances today, I think that it will have all the precedential
significance of Bush versus Gore.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: We won't go further with your an-
swer on that, Dave, but let me just end by asking Panelist Milton
Kayle: What is your general assessment of whether the Steel Sei-
zure case had an impact on the legacy of President Truman?
MR. KAYLE: Well, first of all, you have to -- when I think
about these issues, my admiration for the President grows.
Of course I am prejudiced, of course, but here, he wasn't con-
cerned about his legacy.
At the time, he knew that public-relations-wise, he was going to
get severe reactions, but he nevertheless went ahead, because he
believed this was the right thing to do, and I can't -- I would feel
remiss if I didn't bring to the attention of everyone here, if they
are not aware of this, but two years ago, C Span conducted a sur-
vey from 57 leading historians about the presidential leadership
qualities up to that date, and it is interesting to note that the final
results were as follows:
Number 1, Abraham Lincoln. Number 2, FDR. Number 3,
George Washington. Number 4, Theodore Roosevelt. Number 5,
Harry Truman.
I think as time has gone by, his contribution to making this a
stronger, more vital democracy is proof that one can grow in the
office if one has enough confidence in his own convictions to deal
with the most educated men and to deal yet with the man in the
street.
All of these quantities, from my standpoint, make him a great
President.
I do not feel, that all things being equal, his stature was dimin-
ished by what happened in the Steel Case. He did what he
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thought was right, and incidentally, if every president has to go
behind the recommendations of his Secretary of Defense and to do
a separate investigation of what he is being told, we are in a sad
situation.
The President, he accepted what Lovett was saying. Lovett
said, "We are eating our own bone marrow. We are living off of
whatever we had left at that stage of the game." They may have
been making bicycles, but in the long run, if we had continued not
to produce steel, we would have been in a very serious situation,
and who knows how long it would have been before a settlement
was reached in the steel case if the President hadn't followed the
course he did and let the union know that to the extent they
stayed on the job, he understood and appreciated what they were
doing.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And Mr. Hechler, you are itching
to say something there.
MR. HECHLER: With all due respect to this tremendous au-
dience here, the effect of the Steel Seizure Case will be an infini-
tesimal blip on the historical radar screen.
If you look at any account of President Harry Truman, as Milton
says, he ranked fifth. Sometimes he ranked sixth. Sometimes
they put Jefferson in there.
What do they call attention to about President Truman?
Civil rights, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, NATO, Point
4, the big things that he did.
Nobody ever mentions the Steel Seizure case.
(Laughter.)
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Dr. Marcus, you are the historian.
What do you say?
DR. MARCUS: I agree with Ken Hechler, but in terms of the
Steel Seizure Case, I don't think that did terrible harm to Presi-
dent Truman, either.
I have great respect for what he did.
I think his intentions were completely honorable and principled,
and based on a wide and careful reading of history, he believed
that presidential power was very important, and you must take
action in an emergency.
I sort of agree with Felix Frankfurter, who prefaced his very
long opinion with the statement that "it is absurd to see a dictator
in a representative product of the sturdy Democratic tradition
that is in the Mississippi Valley."
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I agree whole-heartedly, and I think that he was absolutely sin-
cere in everything he did, and he went to Congress the next day
and said, "If you don't like my seizure, you tell me to give the steel
mills back and tell me what to do."
And of course Congress walked away, and I think the lesson of
this particular incident, and of course the opinions in the Steel
Seizure case is that in current affairs, Congress should be more
assertive and pay attention to what is going on.
MR. FELLER: Can I add a comment?
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: Please.
MR. FELLER: In one sense, Truman's loss in the Steel Seizure
Case was a product of his best qualities.
I have often wondered why the case took place. Everybody
knew from the beginning that if the steel companies won the case,
the result would be a steel strike. That was obvious -- we knew it.
When Judge Pine issued his injunction, the men went out.
When the Court of Appeals stayed the injunction, the men went
back.
Everybody knew that the minute the steel companies won, the
men would be on strike, and the question is: Why did they liti-
gate? What were they trying to accomplish?
Well, for one, they were trying to get a higher price for steel.
We knew that, but it became evident pretty soon that they weren't
going to get that.
Indeed, I think the then price administrator later wondered why
in the end they settled for exactly the same terms, in terms of the
price increase, and exactly the terms in terms of wage increases
and benefit increases that were offered to them in April before the
seizure. I puzzled about that question for a long time, and I have
finally come to a conclusion. They may have had some faint no-
tion that they could bludgeon the Truman administration into a
higher price increase, but there was a second reason, I think was
really the right one: Harry Truman's seizures speech! If you go
back and read it, it was one of the bluntest, most outspoken pieces
ever delivered. It was "Give 'em Hell Harry at his best. He laid
out the economic case in bitter terms, and that got the industry
mad. Rhetoric does have its consequences, and his rhetoric was so
honest, so direct, so true that it got the companies mad, and they
decided they were going to beat him. That is why we had the
whole Steel Seizure Case and the strike. Maybe I am wrong, but
if you go back in history, and you say, "Well, why; why did this all
happen; how did it happen," I think it was all because of Harry's
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courageous direct speech. He didn't lay a little bit here, a little bit
there, or come down the middle.
Franklin Roosevelt would do that kind of thing. But Harry
Truman laid it on the line. He laid it on hard, and they reacted
with the lawsuit.
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: But in the long run, it didn't seem
to hurt Harry very much, and I think we will end our panel there.
Let's thank our panelists.
(Applause.)
Program Presentation
PROFESSOR GORMLEY: And before you leave, we have one
last special part of the program, if we could, and the panelists can
just stay right here for the last part of the program that we have
been waiting for.
For today's program, I would like to ask Dr. Charles Dougherty,
the President of Duquesne, to come forward to present a special
Presidential Citation.
I also would like to ask Dr. Michael Devine, director of the Tru-
man Library, to please step forward, and finally, I would like to
call forth Clifton Truman Daniel.
As he comes forward, you may see a couple of photographs with
him and a person you might recognize. Mr. Daniel is the grandson
of President Truman.
PRESIDENT DOUGHERTY: I think we can appreciate, after
this extraordinary session today, what has made Harry S. Truman
one of the most respected and admired American presidents over
time.
One can certainly debate the wisdom of President Truman's de-
cision to seize the steel mills in 1952, just as one can debate the
wisdom of other presidential actions in our nation's history, but it
is hard to quarrel with the fact that President Harry S. Truman
took positions, even controversial positions, based upon an honest,
unequivocal belief that these would benefit the American public in
the long run.
In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of
the presidency of Harry S. Truman, I am therefore pleased to is-
sue the following citation to the Truman Library and to the Tru-
man family.
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Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States, guided
our nation through the difficult conclusion of World War II, par-
ticipated in the founding of the United Nations and the creation of
NATO, signed a bill creating the Marshall Plan, which provided
aid to rebuild Europe's economy after the tragedy of war, and took
unprecedented steps to desegregate the Armed Forces and to
eliminate racial discrimination in federal employment.
His plain speaking honesty during the seven and a half years in
the White House and his reverence for the office of the presidency,
which led him to make popular and unpopular decisions with
equal conviction, based upon his own internal compass, have
placed Harry S. Truman in the select company of the greatest
presidents, statesmen, and public servants in the history of the
United States.
In commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the
Truman presidency, we recognize and honor his unvarnished in-
tegrity and belief in the long-term vitality of the American ideal
towards which he believed every political leader and citizen should
steadfastly strive.
A half century after Harry S. Truman completed the duties of
office that God and history placed in his hands, I hereby issue a
special Presidential Citation recognizing his many accomplish-
ments on behalf of the United States, his sense of duty to country,
his unwavering belief in our democratic system of government,
and his love of God and fellow man.
Now, therefore,- as President of Duquesne University, I hereby




MR. DANIEL: Okay. I submit, first of all, thank you all very
much, Mr. President, panelists. I really enjoyed that.
I am not a student of Harry Truman. I should be, probably, but
I love opportunities like this to come and listen and learn.
My grandfather certainly did know his own mind. About two
minutes before that picture was taken, my mother had told him
not to do that.
(Laughter.)
MR. DANIEL: She was leaving the country, and he waited un-
til she was gone in the car. Then he stuck us up in the window.
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This moment represents a marvelous milestone for me and the
family. I am honored by my legacy by being related to Harry
Truman.
I can now come and pick up citations for his goofs and his losses.
It has now gotten to where I don't have to come and pick up cita-
tions for the successes and the victories any more.
He, as has been said by the panelists, and I think very well, he
did know his own mind, and he did what he did out of the sense of
Justice and a sense of advocacy for all Americans.
He was -- one of the great things I think about him was, one of
the things that made him a great President was that in instances
like this in the Steel Seizure Case, he could win, and he could lose,
but he always kept a sense of himself, and he always kept a sense
of perspective, and I will tell you a story that I'm sure Milton
Kayle has heard before.
This took place probably not too long after the Steel Seizure
Case.
It was in the early to mid '50s, after he retired and had gone
back to Independence.
You could get close to a ex-President in those days. They didn't
have Secret Service. Grandpa did not have Secret Service until
1963.
He didn't even have a lock on his gate, and a man was driving
past the house in Independence, and he got a flat fire in front of
the house, so he walked up and rang the doorbell. He didn't know
where he was, and grandpa answered the door in his short
sleeves, and the guy said, "I have a flat tire. Can I use your
phone?"
Grandpa said, "Sure. Go on. Use it. That's terrible."
The guy came in the house. He let him use the phone.
He called the garage. The garage said, "It will be five or ten
minutes before we get a truck out there."
The guy said, "I will wait out by my truck."
Grandpa says, "No, you don't. You sit down here. We will talk,"
and they did.
They sat. They chatted. They had a nice time.
Finally, the truck showed up, and grandpa walked him to the
front door and walked him out, and the guy shook his hand, and
he said, "Thank you very much. I appreciate the hospitality. I
enjoyed talking to you."
Grandpa said, "Sure."
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The guy turned around, and he got halfway down the front steps
and stopped, and he looked back up, and he said, "You know some-
thing? You look like that son of a bitch, Harry Truman."
(Laughter.)
MR. DANIEL: And grandpa just smiled at him and said, "I am
that son of a bitch."
Thank you all very much.
(Applause and laughter.)
DR. DEVINE: Well, on behalf of the Truman Presidential Li-
brary and Museum, I would like to thank our host at Duquesne
University for the wonderful job he has done in putting this pro-
gram together.
I would like to quickly thank also my deputy director, Scott
Rowley, who is here today in the front row.
Last year, before -- I have only been at the Truman Library for
about 14 months, and in the early stages of the planning, Scott
worked with the people here at Duquesne to get this program un-
der way, so I appreciate his good work as well.
A program like this points to the importance of maintaining the
historical record.
If I could just be allowed a moment here, and just to get a little
advertisement for the historical record, as a historian, I realize, as
the last person speaking today, I am standing between you and
the cocktail hour, so I will be very brief, but to do a program like
this, to look back on a case like the Youngstown versus Sawyer, it
is important that we have not only the federal archives, the fed-
eral records that are maintained in presidential libraries and the
National Archives and records of administrations' various hold-
ings throughout the country, but that historical societies, special
collections, libraries, and universities maintain their records of
the individuals, maintain letters, manuscripts, memoirs, oral his-
tories, so that not only can we look at the facts and the legal issues
of a case like this, which may or may not be the most significant
issue that took place during Truman's tumultuous time as Presi-
dent, but certainly a case that we do look back to, not so much on
labor issues any more, but on the issue of the importance of presi-
dential power and the limits of presidential power during a time of
national crisis, so the case is still important, and this kind of study
of a historical incident in depth can only be made real and mean-
ingful if we have the historical record in such a complete form that
we not only look at the facts and the legal issues, but also, the
very complex historical context in which an incident like the Steel
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Case took place, so once again, thank you all very much for your
attendance, and thank you, Duquesne University, for hosting this
wonderful conference.
(Applause.)
DEAN NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI: Thank you, Mr. Daniel and
Dr. Devine, for your remarks.
We can't conclude this program today without thanking all of
those from the Truman Library, from Duquesne University and its
great CTS Department, the Duquesne Law Review, who joined in
to make this an extraordinary program.
I also want to thank our panelists in a very special way and Pro-
fessor Gormley for his organizational efforts. I think you have
outdone yourself, and I am proud to be your colleague on the Du-
quesne Law School faculty.
Now I would like to invite all of you to join us in the back, where
we will have a chance to mingle with our panelists and our special
guests for some refreshments, and while we relax, we are going to
play for you some music from 1952, and the first piece is by Presi-
dent Harry Truman, himself, playing one his favorite songs, the
"Blackhawk Waltz."
Thank you all for joining us today.
(Applause.)
(Whereupon, at 5:18 o'clock PM, the symposium concluded.)

